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At midnight on 15 June 1825, a group of African-born men took arms against 
their masters in the coffee plantation region of Guamacaro in western Cuba. 
After meeting up they marched on from plantation to plantation, executing 
white men, women and children and setting crops and buildings on fire, as 
they advanced towards the small village of Coliseo, where they would meet 
their final defeat at the hands of a combined force formed of a local militia and 
well-armed neighbors.1 The African armed movement that shook the 
foundations of the then expanding Cuban slave plantation economy was 
organized and put into action by men who had learned all they knew about 
war in their African homelands. This armed movement presented many of the 
traits associated with the so-called African slave revolts that took place in 
Bahia Brazil, and Cuba during the first half of the nineteenth century.2 Time 
                                                
1 Manuel Barcia, The Great African Slave Revolt of 1825: Cuba and the Fight for 
Freedom in Matanzas (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2012), 97-
112. 
2 For Bahia see, among others: Howard Prince, ÒSlave Rebellion in Bahia, 1807-
1835,Ó Ph.D. Diss. Columbia University, 1972; Joo Jos Reis, Rebelio escrava no 
Brasil: a histria do levanter dos Mals em 1835 (So Paulo: Companhia das Letras, 
2003); and the translation of an early version into English, Slave Rebellion in Brazil: 
The Muslim Uprising of 1835 in Bahia (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 
1995). For the Cuban case see: Robert L. Paquette, Sugar is Made with Blood: The 
Conspiracy of La Escalera and the Conflict between Empires over Slavery in Cuba 
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and again during their march towards Coliseo, the leaders and their soldiers 
were forced to make ethical decisions that defined their actions.  
 A few years ago, while discussing West African warfare in the context 
of the Yoruba civil conflicts of the early nineteenth century, historian Toyin 
Falola asked for a more comprehensive research agenda that would provide 
new ample and inclusive studies of several aspects about these wars, and 
that these should address, among other things, the role played by the ethics 
of war.3 The same problems that have affected the study of conflagrations in 
West Africa, have been present in the study of West African warfare in the 
Americas, and arguably nowhere more so than in relation to the ethics of war. 
Scholars of the African Diaspora have until now shown little interest in the 
ethical questions associated to these dozens of armed movements that took 
place in the first half of the nineteenth century, often considering them as 
nothing more than products of their exposure to new ideas and ideologies 
originating in Europe and the Americas.4 This article seeks to rectify this 
                                                                                                                                      
(Middleton, CT.: Wesleyan University Press, 1987); Matt D. Childs, The 1812 Aponte 
Rebellion and the Struggle against Atlantic Slavery (Chapel Hill: The University of 
North Carolina Press, 2006); Manuel Barcia, Seeds of Insurrection: Domination and 
Resistance on Western Cuban Plantations (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University 
Press, 2008); and The Great African Slave Revolt of 1825; Michele Reid-Vazquez, 
The Year of the Lash: Free People of Color in Cuba and the Nineteenth-Century 
Atlantic World (Athens, GA.: University of Georgia Press, 2011); and Aisha K. Finch, 
Rethinking Slave Rebellion in Cuba: La Escalera and the Insurgencies of 1841-1844 
(Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2015). 
3 Toyin Falola, ÒA Research Agenda on the Yoruba in the Nineteenth Century,Ó 
History in Africa 15 (1988): 215-6. 
4 The scholarship focusing on the impact of the American, French, and Haitian 
revolutions, among others, upon actions of war protagonized by African slaves in the 
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absence of an in-depth study of West African military ethics in the Diaspora by 
offering a first approximation to the problem. It will do so by exploring a 
number of relevant particular issues which shall permit a detailed analysis of 
their ethics of war, as they were learned and understood according to West 
African traditions and practices. 
 Using case studies extracted from primary sources produced 
predominantly in Bahia, Brazil and Cuba, this article contends that West 
African military commanders and troops in both regions exhibited an ethical 
behavior associated with war, which was strongly tied to their cosmologies of 
the world. These cosmologies were the result of a learning process that had 
begun and developed Ð at least until they were enslaved and sent to the 
Americas Ð in their African homelands. Throughout the article, these 
movements are referred to not as slave revolts or rebellions, but as actions of 
war; indeed, West African actions of war to be more precise.5 As I have 
argued elsewhere, the testimonies of the vast majority of those interrogated 
by Brazilian and Cuban authorities following each of these military actions 
make reference to their actions as actions of war. It is as such, then, that they 
are studied here.6  
 Furthermore, since these actions were all staged against either slavery 
or enslavement, it is argued that the central ethical issue of whether it was 
right to take arms and kill people they considered enemies (jus ad bellum), 
                                                                                                                                      
Americas during the nineteenth century is quite extensive, and new titles continue to 
appear every years discussing new aspects of it. 
5 Barcia, West African Warfare in Bahia and Cuba Soldier Slaves in the Atlantic 
World, 1807-1844 (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2014), 97-105. 
6 Ibid. 
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was decided from the moment the protagonistsÕ and participantsÕ plans took 
shape. Further ethical issues that could and would arise once each of these 
armed movements was underway, which were more ambiguous, are also 
considered in this article.  
 
To make war or not 
Most of the existing scholarship on ethical issues relating to warfare has been 
built upon contemporary cases that pertain to organized, large-scale modern 
and contemporary warfare.7 These studies, which are plentiful, have made a 
number of important contributions to our understanding of some of the 
principal issues at stake, including, but not limited to the laws of war, pre-
emptive and preventive warfare, humanitarian intervention, and collateral 
damage. Central to almost every study is the issue of jus ad bellum, or what it 
is that constitutes a just war. The focus on the just war aspect is a direct and 
inevitable result of what can be viewed as the western perspective adopted by 
the majority of these studies; a viewpoint which understands wars as 
observable events whose essence can be discerned only through the 
ÔsuperiorÕ and most ÔcivilizedÕ eyes of the white man.8   
                                                
7 For a few recent examples of this trend see: Stephen Nathanson, Terrorism and the 
Ethics of War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010); Christian Ennemark, 
Armed Drones and the Ethics of War: Military Virtue in a Post-Heroic Age (London: 
Routledge, 2013); A. J. Coates, The Ethics of War (Manchester: Manchester 
University Press, 2016); and David L. Perry, Partly Cloudy: Ethics in War, Espionage, 
Covert Action and Interrogation (New York and London: Rowman & Littlefield, 2016). 
8 Betrand Russell, ÒThe Ethics of War,Ó International Journal of Ethics 25, no. 2 
(1915): 127-42; James T. Johnson, ÒNatural Law as a Language for the Ethics of 
War,Ó The Journal of Religious Ethics 3, no. 2 (1975): 217-42; Gaoshan Zuo and Xi 
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 In the words of Torkel Brekke Ð one of the few scholars to attempt to 
write a comparative ethical study of warfare in specific western and non-
western societies Ð Òthe academic study of the ethics of war often takes the 
European just war tradition as its point of departure.Ó9 I would dare to add that 
these studies do so without even bothering to examine or elucidate the 
cultural differences between warfare in the western and non-western worlds. 
In the words of John K. Thornton, when it comes to the study of African 
warfare, Òmilitary backwardness has been assumed as a parallel to economic 
backwardness.Ó10 Unsurprisingly, the result has been the creation of an 
abysmal gulf between the number of studies on western and non-western 
warfare, which is compounded by the patronizing view eschewed by 
traditional military historians of societies that do not fit the western mold.   
 Such a biased understanding of warfare has frequently led authors to 
offer hypothetical lose-lose situations as examples in which their protagonists, 
Ð which are almost always white western observers facing non-white, non-
western actors Ð are presented with moral dilemmas for which there are no 
viable ways out. Certainly none through which they can redeem their western 
humanity and superior moral standing. Confronted with the brutality and 
ethical dubiousness of non-white, non-western antagonists, these white 
                                                                                                                                      
Yunpeng, ÒJust war and justice of war: Reflections on ethics of war,Ó Frontiers of 
Philosophy in China 2, no. 2 (2007): 280-90; and Rosemary B. Kellison, ÒCharacter 
and Critique in the Ethics of War,Ó Soundings: An Interdisciplinary Journal 97, no. 2 
(2014): 174-85. 
9 Torkel Brekke, ÒThe Ethics of War and the Concept of War in India and Europe,Ó 
Numen: International Review for the History of Religions 52, no. 1 (2005): 60. 
10 John K. Thornton, Warfare in Atlantic Africa, 1500-1800 (London: UCL Press, 
1999), 7. 
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western protagonists are often forced to commit a minor atrocity in the hope of 
avoiding a major one perpetrated by those putting them in the spot. A case in 
point is that used by Barry Paskins and Michael Dockrill in The Ethics of War, 
in which Jim, an English botanist (white westerner) who is doing research in a 
Latin-American rainforest comes across Pedro, a local captain (non-white, 
non-westerner) who is about to execute in cold blood twenty Indians for some 
random reason. In an ironic twist, which also serves to illustrate the 
callousness of the non-white, non-westerner Pedro, he offers Jim a choice: 
Òyou shoot one of the Indians or I shoot them all.Ó11 Under such pressure, 
JimÕs humanity is put to the test by PedroÕs unmitigated lack of benevolence 
and mercy for either him or the twenty Indians he was about to execute.  
Such one-dimensional conceptualizations of warfare based on western 
understanding, and the use of western terms that do not apply to non-western 
societies, are therefore problems which are additionally loaded with nostalgic 
pseudo-colonial or imperial elements that presuppose, although this is never 
explicitly stated as far as I know, that white westerners are less violent and 
more morally responsible and humane than those from other backgrounds. 
This presupposition, as should be expected, is particularly amplified when the 
subjects of study are Africans, regardless of whether their actions of war are 
undertaken in Africa or in the Diaspora.  
Interesting as they are, lose-lose impossible predicaments such as the 
one faced by Jim the botanist, an American president about to allow a drone 
attack in the Middle East in the hope of killing a well-known terrorist while 
                                                
11 Barry Paskins and Michael Dockrill, The Ethics of War (London: Duckworth, 1979), 
152. 
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causing the collateral deaths of innocent women and children, or the WWII 
Allied generals being forced to send their men to a certain death during the D-
Day invasion in Normandy in the hope of defeating Nazi Germany, do not 
contribute much to theoretical or methodological models applied to the 
examination of West African warfare in the Diaspora in the first half of the 
nineteenth century.  
Widely differing parameters and conceptions of warfare come into play, 
chief among them is the previously mentioned concept of jus ad bellum, 
whose usefulness is negligible if we depart from the basic fact that all West 
African military actions in Bahia and Cuba between 1807 and 1844 were first 
and foremost directed against enslavement as a social condition or against 
slavery as a socio-economic system. In both cases, the rightfulness of the 
struggle of West African men and women is hardly questionable, since their 
fight for freedom basically renders the need for a jus ad bellum justification, or 
even discussion, meaningless.  
Does that means that we cannot talk of a West African ethics of war in 
the Diaspora? In reality, as suggested above, many issues central to the 
study of war ethics are irrelevant when considered in the specific military 
instances that are discussed in the following paragraphs. For example, 
matters concerning the stateÕs duty to protect its citizens are rendered null, as 
these West African men, women and children had no state that could protect 
them.12 Equally, another essential element in discussions about the ethics of 
                                                
12 The role of the estate has been discussed at length in plenty of studies. See, for 
example, Brian Orend, ÒMichael Walzer on Resorting to Force,Ó Canadian Journal of 
Political Science 33, no. 3 (2000): 523-47; and Andrew Fiala, ÒPractical Pacifism, Jus 
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war during the past few decades, that of pacifism, should not be 
retrospectively applied to nineteenth-century actions of war, since the term 
was first adopted in 1901 during the 10th Universal Peace Congress 
celebrated in Glasgow, Scotland, and thus its use would be strictly 
anachronistic.13  
Every known war action undertaken by West African men, women, and 
children in Bahia and Cuba throughout the first half of the nineteenth century 
was also a self-defense action and a form of resistance against oppression. 
Thus, each of these actions was essentially just by any and all measures. 
Consequently, in this article, instead of following existing models resulting 
from studies of western warfare, often associated with religion, and mostly 
concerned with determining when waging war is just and when is not, I 
concentrate on the ethical details of planned or spontaneous actions that are 
by definition just. I do so by presenting case studies extracted from primary 
sources while exploring a number of conceptual and epistemological matters 
related to these actions. 
 
Ethical issues once war is underway 
Some issues are universal to any armed conflagration and as such, are worth 
examining, with the intention of drawing fresh conclusions not centered on the 
just war principle, and instead tailor-made for each circumstance and built 
                                                                                                                                      
in bello, and citizen responsibility: The case of Iraq,Ó Ethical Perspectives 13, no. 4 
(2006): 673-97.  
13 It should be pointed out, however, that even pacifists have backed up military 
actions when these have been justified. Proceedings of the Tenth Universal Peace 
Congress: Held in the St. AndrewÕs Hall, Glasgow, from 10th to 13th September, 1901 
(Bern: International Peace Bureau, 1902). 
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while keeping into consideration cultural differences and specificities. Some of 
them have been hardly ever been discussed, as their precise characteristics 
either do not match or do not apply traditional western warfare.  
 
Ethics of killing non-combatant enemies 
 
In spite of what documents produced by colonial and imperial authorities say, 
Africans in the diaspora often wanted more than simply to kill their masters or 
all whites.  Authorities and planters who recorded news of these so-called 
revolts and rebellions started a pseudo-tradition of what we can only refer to 
as an oversimplification of the ideas and actions of those Africans who had 
decided to take arms. More problematic, and until very recently, generation 
upon generation of historians willingly reproduced this narrowed and 
westernized version of history, solidifying myths created precisely by those 
who enslaved, exploited, and violently repressed those same Africans.14  
In reality, and for most of the period studied here, West African men 
and women in the Diaspora had diverse and often intricate reasons to go to 
war. When scrutinized, historical sources tell a very different story to that 
presented to us until very recently. Theirs was a history of conflict and 
violence, but also one of simple human aspirations and a strong desire for 
freedom.  
It is true that Ôkilling all the whitesÕ was often given as a reason by 
captured rebels and by key witnesses. In the Cuban case alone, there were 
such claims made during a number of recorded instances of armed struggle. 
For example, in 1806, a Creole slave named Francisco Fuertes had been 
                                                
14 There have been a number of exceptions to this rule. See for example the authors 
cited in footnote no. 2. 
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recruiting men for the movement he hoped to lead in the neighborhood of 
Guara, south of Havana, by assuring them that slaves from the surrounding 
estates were ready to take arms in order to kill all of the whites, including their 
children.15 Similar accusations were made against the leader of the 1825 
movement in Guamacaro, Lorenzo Lucum, who was said to have visited 
several plantations promising people that with the war all would be lost, and 
that they would make sure to kill all the whites in the process.16 Even before 
these two instances took place, in 1798, the leaders of an aborted plot in the 
southern town of Trinidad, were said to want to kill all the whites, and run 
away to Jamaica, where they hoped to join the maroon communities there.17 
 From these testimonies, we can also infer that even when the 
extermination of the white population may have been a constant in the minds 
of the slaves, some ethical and moral conundrums may have existed as well. 
In the vast majority of cases recorded, killing innocent women and children 
constituted an issue that the rebels dealt with once their military operations 
were underway. The alleged willingness of Francisco Fuertes to kill all the 
white children he would encounter was echoed in more than one opportunity 
in the decades to come. In 1825, Lorenzo Lucum, who had gone around 
promising his fellow Africans that they would be allowed to kill all the whites, 
was forced to make a stand against one of his subordinates at the beginning 
                                                
15 Gloria Garca, Conspiraciones y revueltas: la actividad poltica de los negros en 
Cuba (1790Ð1845) (Santiago de Cuba: Oriente, 2003), 38-9; Ada Ferrer, FreedomÕs 
Mirror: Cuba and Haiti in the Age of Revolution (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2014), 218-20; and Barcia, The Great African Slave Rebellion of 1825, 61-2. 
16 Barcia, The Great African Slave Revolt of 1825, 129-31. 
17 Luis Alexandro de Bassecourt to the Count of Santa Clara, Trinidad, 3 August 
1798. Archivo General de Indias: Estado, 1/80. 
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of the Guamacaro military uprising.18 On this occasion, Lorenzo had to stop 
Antonio Carabal from executing the youngest son of British planter Joshua 
Armitage, after every other member of the family, including two other children, 
had been killed in cold blood moments before. To Lorenzo, and some 
domestic female slaves who also protected the toddler, taking the life of this 
child was simply unacceptable, as, in his own words, Òhe knew nothing,Ó of the 
suffering his elders had inflicted upon the Africans.19 On this occasion, as in 
other cases, internal disagreement among those who had taken arms and put 
their lives at risk to fight against enslavement or slavery, turned into a 
contentious, potentially challenging issue. The discrepancies between 
Lorenzo Lucum and Antonio Carabal were hardly unique or rare, as they 
appeared in one way or another in virtually every other West African armed 
movement during the period.20 
 White women, for example, were variously perceived either as innocent 
bystanders or as pernicious antagonists. In many cases, their lives were taken 
without warning, while in many others they escaped unharmed even after 
being surrounded or captured by West African troops. Additionally, in a 
number of cases they were also considered to be valuable trophies to the 
rebels-to-be, who determined that once the war was over, their lives should 
be spared so that they could marry them, even if against their wishes. It could 
                                                
18 Barcia, The Great African Slave Revolt of 1825, 105. 
19 Ibid. 
20 For example, in Cuba, there were disagreements between the leaders of the 1833 
and 1843 military forces in Banes and La Guanbana, and in Bahia similar instances 
were recorded in some of the major movements occurred in the period, including 
those of 1814 in Iguape, and those of 1830 and 1835 in Salvador.  
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be argued that these propositions may have constituted a central ethical 
dilemma to some, although the women of the defeated have also been 
enslaved and married across various West African regions for centuries.21  
 Intriguingly enough, some records seem to suggest that to those 
leading West African forces in Bahia and Cuba, not all white men were 
considered to be equals. At least on one occasion, a West African group of 
men suggested sparing the lives of poor Canary Islands migrants (isleos) so 
that they could be used as laborers, while on another, British engineers were 
supposed to be kept alive so that they could keep the mills and railways 
working.22 In these instances, West Africans do not seem to have had any 
ethical issues while discussing the virtual enslavement of white men who, in 
every way, they associated with those they hoped to defeat, but who they also 
saw, to an extent, as independent players in their own right. This 
independence was to them nothing short of a sort of currency, which would 
                                                
21 On keeping white women alive so they could be married to victorious African 
soldiers see Barcia, The Great African Slave Revolt of 1825, 207. See also Robin 
Law, ÒAn Alternative Text of King Agaja of DahomeyÕs Letter to King George I of 
England, 1726,Ó History in Africa 29 (2002): 268; Robin Law, ed., Dahomey and the 
Ending of the Transatlantic Slave Trade: British Vice-Consul to the Kingdom of 
Dahomey, West Africa, 1851-1852 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 217. In 
both cases, King Agaja in 1726 and King Gezo in 1851, mentioned cases in which 
the women of the defeated were married by the victors. Olatunji Ojo has also 
discussed the fate of the Yoruba women captured in war, although for a later period. 
See Ojo, ÒSlavery, Marriage, and Gender Relations in Eastern Yorubaland, 1875-
1920,Ó in Judith A. Byfield, LaRay Denzer, and Anthea Morrison, eds., Gendering the 
African Diaspora: Women, Culture, and Historical Change in the Caribbean and 
Nigerian Hinterland (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2010), 144-77. 
22 See, among others, the depositions of Melitn and Jos Gang. Gibacoa, May 
1844. Archivo Histrico de la Oficina del Historiador de la Ciudad de la Habana, 
Fondo General, 117/1. 
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have been enough to allow them to stay alive, but not enough to see them 
retain their freedom. 
Indeed, in the frenzy of these actions of war, even other Africans could 
be targeted. It is well known that both in Bahia and Cuba, Creole slaves 
hardly ever joined West Africans in their military endeavors, often because 
they were not allowed to do so.23 More to the point, they were often 
considered to be the collaborators of their masters and authorities, and as 
such, there were very few ethical reasons not to target them once military 
actions got underway. A similar situation was that of Bantu Africans, who were 
also considered to be pliant to the white man, and therefore untrustworthy. 
Their participation in West African armed uprisings in both regions was almost 
as limited as that of the Creoles.24 It should be pointed out that, as a 
significant number of West African combatants in Bahia and Cuba during this 
period were Muslim, they may have found a justification for violent actions in 
the teachings of some Islamic thinkers, who over time had stated that Muslims 
had the obligation of fighting slavery and attaining freedom.25 As a matter of 
fact, one of the main reasons behind the jihād started in 1804 by Uthman dan 
                                                
23 Reis, Slave Rebellion in Brazil, 141-6; Barcia, West African Warfare in Bahia and 
Cuba, 132-4. 
24 Ibid. 
25 See, for example, Paul Lovejoy, Transformations in Slavery: A History of Slavery in 
Africa (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), 30-2, 70-3; and Timothy 
Cleveland, ÒAhmad Baba al-Timbukti and his Islamic critique of racial slavery in the 
Maghrib,Ó Journal of North African Studies 20, no. 1 (2015): 42-64. 
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Fodio, founder of the Sokoto Caliphate, was precisely the need the fight 
against the enslavement of Muslims by non-believers.26 
 Uncontrolled violence, fuelled sometimes by the exaggerated 
consumption of spirits and liquors, turned some of these movements into 
frenetic events where most of those who antagonized the rebels were 
targeted and executed, without much ethical or moral consideration 
regardless of their skin color or status. The issue of alcohol consumption is 
one that should not be taken lightly, as its occurrence often led to clouded 
judgments on the part of West African combatants, particularly when 
challenging ethical problems were presented to them. In some of those cases 
where white women and children were targeted, those who attacked them and 
slaughtered them were clearly intoxicated.27  
 The execution and planned-subjugation of non-combatant enemies and 
bystanders was, then, a common feature to many of the West African armed 
movements discussed in these pages. Every case, however, was unique and 
particular to the extent to which the leaders were able to exercise their 
authority. In cases like the ones mentioned above leadership could make all 
the difference. Thus, when in 1825 Lorenzo Lucum averted the execution of a 
toddler, or when in 1826 Zeferina Nag ordered an all-out attack on the forces 
which had surrounded the Urubu quilombo, they both determined who lived 
                                                
26 Paul Lovejoy, ÒSlavery, the Bilād al Sūdān, and the Frontiers of the African 
Diaspora,Ó in Paul Lovejoy, ed., Slavery on the Frontiers of Islam (Princeton: Markus 
Wiener, 2004), 15.  
27 A case in question is that of 1825 with which this article begins, where a number of 
West African men stole several bottles of port wine and muscatel from the stores of 
the plantations they attacked, which they then proceeded to consume. Barcia, The 
Great African Slave Revolt of 1825, 112. 
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and who died, and more importantly what actions were correct and honorable, 
and what actions were not.28  
 
The Ethics of loyalty, trust, and honor 
 
Ethical decisions once on the battlefield often fell to men and women such as 
Lorenzo Lucum and Zeferina Nag, who were in command of military forces. 
Subsequently, the leadership qualities of these men and women became vital 
to each and every one of these West African armed movements. Battle 
experience, outlook of the world, and capacity to command obedience were 
among the most desired attributes that any West African military leader in 
Bahia or Cuba could and should have. Various reports from the period point to 
a transferal of military leadership directly from West Africa to the Americas.29 
As I have argued elsewhere, West Africans were left with the human capital 
that survived the Middle Passage, and thus many of those who had been 
military commanders in West Africa were certain to perish before reaching the 
other side of the Atlantic.30 When confronting organized Colonial or Imperial 
troops these men and women were then frequently led by makeshift 
commanders who had little or no real experience leading troops into battle, 
even though a significant number of them had almost certainly been soldiers 
themselves.   
                                                
28 For Zeferina NagÕs leadership and actions see: Imperial Police Guard, Military 
Division, ProsecutorÕs report. Bahia, 17 December 1826. Arquivo Pblico do Estado 
da Bahia (hereafte): Insurrees de Escravos, 2845. Cf. Reis, Rebelio escrava no 
Brasil, 100-102. 
29 Henry B. Lovejoy, ÒOld Oyo Influences on the Transformation of Lucum Identity in 
Colonial Cuba,Ó Ph.D. Diss. UCLA, 2012, 197. 
30 Barcia, West African Warfare in Bahia and Cuba, 116-9.  
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 Some, however, did make it alive and their leadership qualities shined 
through the armed movements they commanded on the other side of the 
Atlantic. Some obvious cases, like those of Lorenzo Lucum and Zeferina 
Nag, have been mentioned here already, but they were by no means the 
only ones. Recognizing them is sometimes an easy task, due to their behavior 
during military actions. A case in point is that of Fierabrs Lucum and Luis 
Lucum during the 1833 armed uprising that started at the Salvador coffee 
plantation southwest of Havana, in the midst of a cholera epidemic that had 
terrorized the entire Cuban population.31  
 Beyond the apparent fact that they led a small army formed mostly of 
Lucum former soldiers, their organizational skills and their readiness to take 
advantage of a moment of weakness of their enemies were traits associated 
with good leaders. Once on the battlefield, they led by example. They were 
reported to shout orders and to carry parasols with them, a clear symbol of 
royalty in the Yoruba-speaking states at the time, and that could indicate not 
only the presence of military commanders but also of royal blood among 
them.32 A respected leader was more likely to be obeyed without hesitation, 
and as such, his or her decision-making often defined the ethical behavior of 
their forces during military operations. For example who was to live and who 
was to die, frequently came down to what these military leaders thought was 
the right thing to do.  
 
Experience and recruitment strategies 
                                                
31 Ibid., 117; Lovejoy, ÒOld Oyo Influences,Ó 197.  
32 Lovejoy, ÒOld Oyo Influences,Ó 197-8. 
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Fierabrs Lucum and Luis Lucum were deeply respected and their orders 
obeyed, even when they entailed mistreating or killing innocent bystanders, a 
circumstance that suggests that they had previous experience of commanding 
other men into battle. The issue of experience is one intrinsically related to 
that of the ethics of war, and that has not been given its rightful place so far in 
many studies of African Diaspora warfare. Experience on the West African 
battlefields would have been crucial when taking arms in the Americas. Many 
men and women taken to Bahia and Cuba during the period examined here 
had been enslaved after being seized in battle. For example, most of the men 
interviewed by the French Consul in Bahia, Francis de Castelnau, in 1848 
confessed to have been soldiers who had participated in numerous 
campaigns before being captured and sent to the Bights to be sold as slaves 
to European slave traders.33 Among them were three Hausa men named 
Mahammah, Braz, and Bou, and also a Borno named Karo, all of which gave 
meticulous, and often gruesome, descriptions of their enslavement as a result 
of their participation in military campaigns in their West African homelands.34 
Equally, some of those interviewed by the German missionary Sigismund 
Koelle in Sierra Leone in the late 1840s and early 1850s also gave him clear 
indications of their past as soldiers and prisoners of war, before being sent 
into the transatlantic slave trade.35  
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34 Ibid. 
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 In Bahia, as in Cuba, veterans from West African military conflicts were 
often the leaders of the so-called slave rebellions that shook both areas 
during the first half of the nineteenth century. There are plenty of examples 
that demonstrate this past experience, some of them quite comprehensive. 
The vast majority of them were carried out in the style of West African military 
raids: fast paced, violent actions that destroyed slave-system infrastructure 
and took the lives of almost all white persons they found in their path.36 The 
military actions that took place in Iguape in 1814 and 1828, in Cotegipe in 
1829, and in Salvador de Bahia in 1830 and 1835, all presented similar 
organization and war tactics. The weapons used by these men and women 
also unequivocally reflected an experience acquired and honed in West 
Africa. Among them were spears, and bows and arrows whose use had been 
already abandoned at the time by Western armies.   
In Cuba, the well-documented uprisings of 1825, 1833 and 1843, 
among others, featured West African war veterans who were able to 
command troops, and lead them into battle just as they would have done in 
their homelands. The use of standards, flags, parasols or umbrellas, and 
horses, also points to the existence of some sort of military ranking system, 
which would probably have included some leaders with royal blood. As briefly 
discussed above, it is well known that in several regions of West Africa, 
parasols or umbrellas were a symbol reserved for those belonging to royal 
                                                                                                                                      
Hair, ÒThe Enslavement of KoelleÕs Informants,Ó Journal of African History 6, no. 2 
(1965): 193-203; esp. 197-8. 
36 For instance, Bahian authorities described the attack upon their forces by the 
Urubu Africans as Òa furious charge.Ó ProsecutorÕs Report, [Piraja], 17 December 
1826. APEB: Insurrees de Escravos, 2845. 
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lineages. Their adoption by West African armies in Cuba during the first half of 
the nineteenth century may be an indication of members of West African royal 
families leading armed forces against plantation owners, local militias, and 
Spanish authorities in Cuba.37 As Henry Lovejoy pointed out, the use of 
umbrellas and specific clothing, including womenÕs dresses, likely suggests 
the existence of Ilari, or royal Oyo bodyguards, engaging in military operations 
on the American side of the Atlantic.38 Equally, the use of horses in various 
armed movements in both Bahia and Cuba, may denote the existence of 
ethical codes associated with leadership qualities acquired in West Africa, 
since, according to Richard Reid, ÒCavalry also implied social stratification, as 
the horsed warrior represented an investment in terms of training as well as 
financial resources, giving rise to a more professional ethic and in turn to 
codes of honour and nobility which became an integral part of 
horsemanship.Ó39  
In one case, led by a number of Gang slaves in 1827, the only 
surviving African confessed that he and his companions had followed Toms 
into battle, because he had been their captain since they were in Africa.40 In 
other cases of armed struggle instigated by recently arrived Lucum bozales, 
such as those recorded in 1836 in the San Pablo plantation and in 1837 in La 
Sonora sugar estate, those who participated were said to have obediently 
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followed the orders shouted by their respective leaders, to whom they were 
likely bound by obedience and with whom they had probably shared the 
experience of war in West Africa in the same military units.41  
 All in all, experience, combined with leadership, contributed to a deeper 
knowledge of what sort of ethical challenges any battle could present. It could 
be argued that the more experience commanders and soldiers had, the more 
likely they were to be prepared to make right decisions, although it could also 
be argued that they may not have always been the most ethical ones. 
Another fundamental element associated with ethical decision-making 
once military actions were underway was the method or methods of 
recruitment deployed by those in command of armed troops. As had been the 
case in many West African societies at the time, recruitment was not always 
optional. West African military commanders in Bahia and Cuba were keen to 
enforce recruitment methods that left little leeway for discrepancy. In some 
cases, those who declined to join their armed forces were beaten, dragged 
around, or simply left in chains while the rest of their companions were freed.  
 In various recorded cases, the slave uprisingsÕ military leaders 
threatened death to any slaves who refused to join them. It happened in June 
1825 in Guamacaro and again in March 1843 in Bemba. Equally, when a 
West African-led armed force later that same year invaded the çcana estate 
in La Guanbana, those slaves who were in shackles were given the option to 
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either being released under the condition of joining the armed uprising, or to 
remain in chains if they so preferred.42  
 A host of similar instances were recorded during the same period in 
Bahia. The military forces led by Hausa Africans in 1814 in Itapu and in 1816 
in Santo Amaro and So Francisco do Conde, threatened and killed those 
who declined their offer to join them in their struggle.43 Something similar 
happened in 1828 in Iguape, where the leaders of a West African force once 
again threatened and wounded those who rejected their invitation to join 
them.44 
 In these cases, as in many others, which were never documented to 
the same level of detail, military commanders did not vacillate in exercising 
their authority over other Africans, even if that meant taking their lives. From a 
purely ethical point of view, these may have been difficult decisions to make, 
but at the same time, they were necessary to assert control and to assure 
those who stayed alive observed the utmost obedience towards them. 
Ethically speaking, these excesses may have been justified, as a necessary 
means to reach a higher and nobler end, and as an essential punishment to 
those without honor or courage.45  
 
The Ethics of withdrawal and surrender 
                                                
42 Deposition of Fermn Lucum. Ingenio Alcanca, April 1843. ANC: Comisin Militar, 
29/5/1. 
43 Reis, Slave Rebellion in Brazil, 45, 50. 
44 Reis, Rebelio escrava no Brasil, 110-1. 
45 John Iliffe, Honour in African History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2005), 87, 348. 
 22 
For West African commanders and soldiers in the Diaspora, the actions of 
withdrawal and surrender carried with them strong ethical connotations. 
Although there are plenty of cases of surrendering recorded, the historical 
record suggests that running away, or even committing suicide were more 
likely acceptable outcomes whenever armed movements failed. This was not 
a new characteristic of West African warfare in the Diaspora, but instead 
something that, as Thornton has discussed elsewhere, was also practiced 
across West Africa at the time.46  
 In the Americas running away was a well known practice since the first 
Africans arrived in La Hispaniola in the early sixteenth century. There, they 
collaborated with the indigenous populations, creating the first runaway slave 
hideouts or palenques recorded in the New World.47 Over the centuries, 
fleeing to the forest, swamp, or mountain became a logical and effective way 
to escape from enslavement and slavery; one that did not necessarily lead to 
the loss of human lives, although those who escaped broadly accepted the 
fact that they would almost certainly be relentlessly hunted down.48  
 In the first few decades of the nineteenth century, both Bahia and Cuba 
saw a persistent flow of runaway Africans fleeing away from oppression in 
cities and plantations. Numerous quilombos in Bahia and palenques in Cuba 
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hosted genuine West African communities in the Diaspora.49 In these 
communities, Nag and Lucum escapees were occasionally the leaders. As a 
matter of fact, even in Sierra Leone, Yoruba-speaking men and women 
considered escaping from the British colonial authorities as the only way to 
secure their freedom during the so-called Aku revolt of 1831.50 
 Fleeing to the bush or to the mountains was an action with very few 
ethical drawbacks, especially for those who had just been defeated in battle. 
In truth, the options left to them were limited to fleeing, surrendering or 
committing suicide, and it seems reasonable that the former was the simplest 
and most logical one to follow. As stated above, cases of fleeing after defeat 
in battle abound both in Bahia and Cuba during the period. In some 
occasions, those who escaped joined existing communities of runaway slaves 
and continued to be a thorn in the side of local authorities for years to come. 
For example, Jos Ramn Mandinga, one of the most prominent participants 
in the armed movement of Guamacaro in 1825, managed to avoid capture for 
almost three years. During that time, he joined forces with other runaway 
slaves in the foothills of Sabanazo, and acquired an almost mythical 
reputation among the slaves living in the region of being impossible to 
apprehend Òdue to his daftness and intelligence in the woods.Ó51 Upon being 
captured in April 1828, he was immediately executed, his body mutilated, and 
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his head and right hand exposed in a public place as a deterrent to other 
slaves from following his example.52 
Surrendering, on the other hand, presented those who had taken arms 
with an ethical problem, since to many of them this was an action that implied 
a permanent loss of honor and the likelihood of heavy punishment or even 
execution. West African men and women were aware of the type of 
punishment that would await those who had actively participated in actions of 
war against the whites, and who had surrendered instead of running away or 
taking their own lives. On more than one occasion this knowledge was 
verbally expressed and written down during the interrogations that followed 
military encounters.53  
 Surrendering, therefore, was a double-edged, heavily charged, ethical 
decision that seldom guaranteed the lives of those who did so, and risked 
tainting their honor forever. Consequently, West African men and women 
seem to have acquiesced to so only when other options were not available, 
such as, for example, when they had been injured in battle and were unable 
to take another course of action, or more rarely, when their military 
commanders ordered them to do so. Military commanders, however, 
frequently resorted to committing suicide as the most effective and honorable 
way out of defeat. 
 
The Ethics of suicide upon defeat 
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It is well known that in some parts of West Africa at the time Òit was 
considered honorable (and even obligatory) in some cultures, for military 
leaders who faced the prospect of capture or defeat in war to commit 
suicide.Ó54 The robust and traditional relationship existing across West Africa 
between honor and the act of committing suicide was documented time and 
again during the period studied here. As Sandra Greene has explained, 
Òmilitary commanders faced with the prospect of being humiliated by their 
enemiesÓ frequently committed suicide rather than surrender.55 In many West 
African regions, taking oneÕs own life was not considered in itself an act of 
cowardice. On the contrary, to many of those defeated men and women, it 
was seen as an effective way to return in body and soul to their own homes. 
Europeans often referred to these beliefs in what they called Òtransmigration 
of the souls,Ó and did everything in their power to limit such beliefs during the 
Middle Passage and upon the arrival of West African men and women in the 
Americas.56  
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 In Bahia, suicides occasionally followed West African actions of war. 
This was the case of the Òmany other rebels,Ó who after participating in the 
famous movement of 1835, known as the Mal uprising, took their own lives 
rather than surrender to the Bahian authorities.57 Equally, a police report 
produced in the aftermath of the armed uprising of 1814 in the Recncavo 
valley, suggested that upon being overpowered by Colonial troops, many 
appear to have committed suicide Òby drowning in the river or by hanging.Ó58 
In what it was probably the best description of a collective act of suicide in 
nineteenth-century Brazil, Bahian soldiers recounted to have found the bodies 
of five African men Òwho had obviously slit each otherÕs throats,Ó after being 
defeated during the Urubu quilombo battle of 1826.59 
 In Cuba, similar cases were recorded throughout the first half of the 
nineteenth century. For example, after the crushing of the 1825 Guamacaro 
movement, some of the leaders opted to take their own lives rather than 
submit to the authorities and makeshift militias that had been formed to 
capture them. Less than two years later, a group of Lucum men confronted 
first their masters at the coffee plantation Tentativa and then a regular 
detachment sent from Matanzas to put their armed insurgency down. 
Overwhelmed by the superiority of the Colonial troops, they were soon beaten 
and forced to retreat. Colonel Joaqun de Miranda y Madariaga, reported that 
when he and his men followed the Africans into the bush, they found no less 
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than eighteen of them hanging from nearby trees.60 Another similar case took 
place after a group of Lucum men and women decided to confront their 
overseer at the La Magdalena sugar estate in 1835. In this occasion, some of 
them were crystal clear while articulating their feelings on the matter, by 
screaming that rather than obeying this manÕs orders, they preferred Òto die 
instead,Ó as several of them eventually did.61 Collective suicides, as well as 
isolated ones, also followed the defeats of the armed movements of 1833 in 
Banes, and 1843 in Bemba and La Guanbana.62  
 All in all, the alleged belief in an afterlife that implied a return to West 
Africa, where these men, women and children could be re-acquainted with 
their relatives, as it was put to planter Jos Leopoldo Yarini in 1833 by a 
Carabal African, constituted an effective way out for those who had just been 
beaten on the battlefield.63 From an ethical point of view, to them committing 
suicide did not exactly equate to the loss of their lives. Instead, this act 
provided them with an opportunity to restart their former lives surrounded by 
their loved ones. As discussed before, taking oneÕs life was also an honorable 
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action that, in contrast with Western ideas about death, denoted courage and 
bravery.64 
 
Conclusions 
 
Just before Bal was forced to take his own life in the aftermath of the 1833 
Lucum armed uprising of Banes, he had to make an important ethical 
decision. In an action that echoed that of the five Africans who slit each 
othersÕ throats in Bahia in 1826, seeing that Och, one of his comrades, had 
been fatally wounded, Bal carried him on his shoulders until Och begged 
him to kill him, rather than continuing his attempt to saving his life. Faced with 
such a delicate decision, Bal took a pistol and shot him dead. Without 
hesitation, he was reported to follow through by placing the barrel in his mouth 
and pulling the trigger, killing himself on the battlefield where he and his 
comrades had just been routed.65 BalÕs ethical predicament was perhaps 
facilitated by the fact that he had been one of the leaders of the movement, 
but also because, as his name suggested, he had likely been a military 
commander somewhere in the Yoruba-speaking territories before being taken 
to Cuba, and had an understanding of how a leader was expected to behave 
and act.66  
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 Decisions such as those taken by Bal, the five Africans of 1826 in 
Urubu, or by the eighteen Lucums who were found hanging from trees after 
the armed uprising at the Tentativa coffee estate in 1827, were engrained in a 
long tradition of West African warfare. This warfare tradition was not without a 
significant quantity of ethical issues that soldiers and their leaders were forced 
to deal with time and again. Many of these ethical decisions involved 
terminating someoneÕs life, had to be taken in haste, and for those who took 
them, having to live with the consequences for the rest of their lives was a real 
prospect. The ethical principles emanating from these West African warfare 
traditions were transferred to the Americas, and as it has been revealed in this 
article, manifested themselves in several of the actions of wars undertaken by 
these men, women, and children in Bahia and Cuba during the first half of the 
nineteenth century. 
 Unlike historical cases drawn from other places where military conflict 
arose, for West Africans in Bahia and Cuba the issue of jus ad bellum did not 
carry the ethical weight that it had in many other settings and environments. 
Instead, West Africans in Bahia and Cuba were confronted by ethical 
problems that, although not unique to their circumstances, were definitely 
disassociated from those stemming from the grand question of when it was 
justified to go to war, and when it was not. As they were not protected by any 
state, and their armed struggle was directed against enslavement as a social 
condition or against slavery as a socio-economic system, the ethical 
dimension behind the jus ad bellum was rendered valueless in each of their 
actions.  
 30 
 Instead, when studying the ethics of war of each of these movements, 
other aspects become essential for the understanding of their actions. The 
behavior of military commanders had consequences for all those who 
followed them. Orders given in the battlefield were usually obeyed, regardless 
of their ethical consequences. The right to kill innocent bystanders, including 
women, children, and the elderly was perhaps the major ethical question they 
were confronted with time and again. Whether to run away or take their own 
lives also became critical ethical conundrums, which were, more often than 
not, resolved according to West African codes of honor brought with them 
across the Atlantic. 
 Any attempt to examine the ethics of war put in practice by these West 
African men and women in Bahia and Cuba in the first half of the nineteenth 
century must disentangle itself from historiographical traditions that have 
privileged the study of western types of warfare.  These traditions, where the 
jus ad bellum still constitutes a departing point, and where pacifism remains a 
central issue to consider, do not allow for a systematic and practical 
examination of the ethics of war of West African slaves in the Americas during 
the period studied here.¤ 
 
